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1. Introduction
At present, the number of small and medium enterprises accounts for 99% of the total number of Chinese
enterprises, with a contribution of more than 60 percent to GDP, more than 50% to tax, and providing more 
than 75 percent of urban jobs. The rapid development of small and medium enterprises not only lays a solid 
foundation for the economic prosperity, but also has made a significant contribution to social harmony and 
stability. Therefore, the development of small and medium enterprises plays a pivotal role in the process of 
sustainable development in China. However, small and medium enterprises in the development process are 
faced with many difficulties, particularly in financing. As is shown in Figure 1, from the various types of 
corporate credit balance statistics of 2009 to the end of 2010 in China we can see: in recent years, China's 
compared with the growth rate of more than 18% of large and
medium- , what s more,
the total of the credit support for small and medium-sized enterprises is less than 
The main reasons that the lending policies of the financial institutions are biased in favor of large enterprises
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The guaranteed loans mode was proposed to solve the small and medium enterprises financing difficulties, but it did not 
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are as follows: first, the financial system of small and medium-sized enterprises is not perfect, while the risk 
management and control capability is not mature enough as well; second, small and medium-sized enterprises 
are small-scale, so they often do not have enough collateral to guarantee; third, the set up time of small and 
medium-sized enterprises usually is short, so that the level of their credit risk is hard for financial institutions to 
identify accurately. In that way, though small and medium-sized enterprises have a strong demand for the 
financing, the financial institutions pay less attention to them in order to control the rate of bad debts and credit 
risk. The needs of small and medium-sized enterprises can not be met because of been ignored, resulting in 
impeding the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. And so forth, it causes further vicious cycle. 
 
Fig. 1 The credit balance of the loan of China's medium and small enterprises from 2009-2010 
Preventing against adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information asymmetry, thus reducing 
the loss caused by default, is the key to solve the small and medium-sized enterprises financing difficulties. 
Followed the farmers guaranteed loans mode ,which has achieved a great success in Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, the People's Bank of China Bazhou Branch first proposed a similar mode in 2003. The mode is 
that two or more than two small and medium enterprises, which are familiar with each other, form a voluntary 
group to apply for loans, sharing the responsibility of jointly guaranteed load. Subsequently, China's major 
banks continue to carry out the business of small and medium-sized enterprises guaranteed loans. Guaranteed 
loads mode on one hand makes up for the small and medium- y in guarantee, lacking 
in collateral; on the other hand, it provides an opportunity for the banks to expand their business. Guaranteed 
loans mode for small and medium enterprises has constantly achieved great success, however, events of load 
default are also not uncommon. The events like" default event of Wenzhou guaranteed loans "and" event of 
Zhejiang Economic Development Group "not only caused the enterprises related with the guaranteed loans into 
a serious crisis, but caused a great deal of impact for the local economic development and social stability as 
well. Therefore, more and more experts and scholars questioned the mode of guaranteed loans. 
Whether guaranteed loans mode has its superiority or not? Why does guaranteed loans mode change from 
"insurance lock" of the risk prevention and control into the "fuse" of the contagion of credit risk? How can 
guaranteed loans mode manage credit risk effectively? All these problems are important practical problem 
urgent to be solved in the financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises in China, and it is also the 
significance that this study lies in. 
2. Review of the Literature 
Guaranteed loans mode is originally proposed to solve the financing problems of the farmers and guard 
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against credit risk with the condition of inadequate collateral to guarantee. Therefore, the initial object that the 
mode researched on is the farmers guaranteed loans problem. Many scholars first in-depth analyze on whether 
the guaranteed loans mode can solve the financing difficulties, Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate (1995) 
verified the actual effects of the operation of the farmers guaranteed loans in Bangladeshi, they thought the 
guaranteed loans mode did not only solve the farmers' loans demand, but also reduced the credit risk. [1] 
Gregorio Impavido (1998) pointed out that the guaranteed loans organizations existed "social punishment" 
within its internal, even in the absence of physical collateral, guaranteed loans mode could still effectively 
solved the problem of credit rationing. [2] However, the effect of the implementation of the guaranteed loans 
modes in different regions is very different, through empirical research of Heilongjiang region in China, Liu 
Feng, et al (2006) found that due to deficiencies in the system of guaranteed loans, the guaranteed loans 
behavior was distorted. [3] Therefore, the scholars gradually focused on exploring the main factors affecting the 
result of guaranteed loans mode. Klaus Abbink and Bernd Irlenbusch (2006) found that the size of the group 
and the tightness of the social relations were the key factors that made impact on the default of the guaranteed 
loans. [4] While Christian Ahlin and Rober M. Townsend (2007) considered rationalized joint responsibility had 
a great impact on the loan repayment rate, and through four types of joint responsibility model, they tested the 
actual effects. [5] Chinese scholars Zhao Yanqing He Guangwen (2007) analyzed the reasons that farmers 
guaranteed loans did not go well, based on game analysis of debit, credit, guarantees. They thought enhancing 
network, trust factors, improving incentives and increasing the defaulting cost were important factors to ensure 
the effective implementation of guaranteed loans mode. [6] James Barham and Clarence Chitemi (2009) 
considered that the maturity of internal structure was also very important in addition to the tightness of the 
internal structure of the guaranteed loans group. [7] Bharat Bhole and Sean Ogden (2010) compared the default 
strategy of guaranteed loans with small loans for farmers, even in the absence of social punishment, guaranteed 
loans was more reasonable. [8] Zhang Zhengping and Xiao Xiong (2012) analyzed the conditions for the 
development of the guaranteed loans of our farmers based on the evolutionary game theory, the study found the 
farmers with similar risk were easier to form a guaranteed loans group. And the guaranteed loans group 
members, gaining more social benefits for assuming responsibility for defaulting members, were more inclined 
to join the group. [9] 
Guaranteed loans mode for small and medium enterprises draws from the farmers guaranteed loans mode. 
However, compared with farmers, the  operations and decision-making mechanisms are more 
complex. Therefore, guaranteed loans mode for small and medium enterprises has its own characteristics. 
Many scholars have conducted extensive research on the guaranteed loans for small and medium enterprises 
according to the situations in China: macro analysis of the effectiveness of the guaranteed loans mode for small 
and medium enterprises. Li Rirong (2011) compared guaranteed loans mode for farmers with guaranteed loans 
mode for small and medium enterprises, he found that the social capital of trust, reputation and long-term 
cooperative relationship with the bank was more valuable to small and medium enterprises. Therefore, it takes 
more advantage to carry out guaranteed loans among small and medium enterprises with close economic ties 
than farmers. [10] Li Zhichen (2012) thought that we should consider guaranteed loans group as a loan subject, 
in order to study the overall credit risk, the industry systemic risk, regional risk and the associated enterprise 
risk. [11] There are also many other scholars analyze the system of guaranteed loans from different angles. Xie 
Shiqing, and Li Siguang (2011) put the reputation as the starting point to analyze, they thought that the 
effective cost of reputation was the institutional basis to carry out the guaranteed loans for small and medium 
enterprises. And Bank excitation conditions endogenously determined the boundary of the market risk of the 
guaranteed loans. [12] Zhou Haifeng and Li Rirong (2011) thought that the size of the members of the 
guaranteed loans group could not be over-expansion. They also suggested developing more guaranteed loans 
groups within the enterprise cluster to solve the financing problem. [13] Hu Guang and Zhao Hua (2012) 
analyzed the perfect information dynamic game model of guaranteed loans for small and medium enterprises 
within the enterprise cluster from both single-stage and repeated games, and proposed that the banks keeping 
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the corporate reputation cost stable at a given value would effectively avoid the default of the guaranteed loans 
enterprises. [14] 
The current study still mainly focuses on the qualitative analysis of the main factors of the guaranteed 
loans mode for small and medium enterprises, while it is lacking in in-depth analysis of the mechanism that 
various factors affect guaranteed loans credit behavior. In fact, the decision-making behavior of defaults within 
guaranteed loans group is not determined by one event, but by constantly modifying their own decision-making 
behavior through learning and imitating the better strategy. Therefore, this paper adopts evolutionary game 
theory and methods, and dynamically analyzes the trend of the credit behavior of enterprises within guaranteed 
loans group. First of all, this paper studies the most simple and basic group composed by the two enterprises 
within guaranteed loans group, in order to reveal general theory and conclusion of the sustainable and stable 
development of guaranteed loans group; Secondly, further to study whether the former conclusions are also 
applicable to N enterprises of guaranteed loans group. In fact, in reality the default punishment incentives and 
the size of the group are closely related to the default rate within the guaranteed loans group, so this article will 
put those factors into the guaranteed loans credit behavior evolution game model, thus making the model closer 
to reality; Finally, some proposals and measures of controlling credit risk will be concluded for enterprises and 
banks. 
3. The evolutionary game model of the credit behavior of small and medium-sized enterprises in 
guaranteed loans organization 
3.1 The basic concept of the evolutionary game theory 
The evolutionary game theory is the combination of game theory and dynamic evolution. [15-16] It differs 
from game theory to focus on the static equilibrium and comparative static equilibrium, but to emphasize the 
dynamic equilibrium. Currently, evolutionary game theory has been widely applied in cooperative behavior[17-19] 
and strategy selection problem[20-21] The core content of the evolutionary game model is the evolutionary stable 
strategy(ESS), it characterizes the dynamic convergence process to the steady state. The replicator dynamic 
equations describe the steady state of the evolutionary game. [22] The dynamic pace of change is expressed as 
UUxdttdx s , x is the proportion of the individuals who choose the policy s, Us is the expected 
revenue of the individuals who choose the policy s, U  is the average benefit of all policy strategy for the 
individual, dttdx  shows the change of ratio that select the policy s over time. 
In order to simplify the problem, the following basic assumptions had been made: 
(1) The probability of success of the project is P and the revenue rate is R. If the project was successful, 
each company gained L*R. Otherwise, gained 0. So the expected revenue of the project I was (L*R)*P. 
Assuming that the loan interest rate was i, each company had to repay the bank financing costs before the 
deadline and financing costs is L(1+i1). 
(2) Every enterprise in the guaranteed loans organization only had two strategies: repay the loans or 
choose to default.  
3.2  Evolutionary game analysis of the credit behavior of simplified case 
Consider the guaranteed loans organization is only composed by two companies, denoted as company 1 
and company 2. If company 1 chose to repay the loans, company 2 faced with two decisions. (a)When 
company 2 chose repay the loans too, both of the two companies gained the same income cI1 ; 
(b)When company 2 chose to default, company 2 gained SI2  and company 1 gained 
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ScI 23 . S expressed the penalties and incentives of the organization. If company 1 chose to default, 
company 2 faced with two decisions. (c)When company 2 chose to repay, company 1 gained SI2  and 
company 2 gained ScI 23 . (d)When company 2 chose to default, both of the two companies would 
punished by bank and gained KI4 .The above game can be described by an symmetric payoff matrix as 
table 1  
Table 1 The payoff matrix of the organization composed by two companies  
 Company 2 
Repay Default 
 
Company 1 
Repay 
1 1  3 2  
Default 
2 3  4 4  
    If the tendency that company 1 chose to repay is , we could get the expected revenue that the company 
chosen different strategies: 
31 )-(1repayU                                                          1  
  42 )-(1defaultU                                                        2  
So the average expected revenue is  
defaultrepayaverage UUU )-(1                                                    3  
    Futher, we could get the replicator dynamics equation of company to choose repay: 
)2-()-()-(1       
)-)(-(1)-(
cSKKc
UUUU
dt
d
defaultrepayaveragerepay                                   4  
    When 0- defaultrepay UU , the number of enterprises which chose to repay would increase, on the 
contrary, the enterprises would change to default. We discussed the nature of the following function. 
cK
cSKKccSKKcf
-
2-)-()2-()-(                            5  
When 0f , we can gain the other stable point 
cK
cS
cK
cSK 12- . 
    In fact, in order to make sure that the companies would chose to repay, the punishment given by the bank 
should be higher than financing costs, K>c. So the nature of the stable point depends primarily on S and c. 
(1)If cS , then 1, we know 0)2-()-()-(1 cSKKc
dt
d
. The compliance 
strategy will eventually become a stable point.  
(2)If cSK 2 , then 0  and 0)2-()-()-(1 cSKKc
dt
d
. Breach of 
policy will eventually become a stable point. 
(3)If cS0  and cSK 2 , then 10 . When the initial compliance proportion higher 
than , the compliance strategy will eventually become a stable point. Otherwise, breach of policy will 
eventually become a stable point. As shown in figure 2. 
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Fig. 2 The stable process of ESS when 10  
    From the above analysis, we know that cSK 2 is the prerequisite for sustainable development of the 
guaranteed loans organization. Improve the bank punishment K would promote compliance strategies become 
the ultimate evolutionary stable strategy. But excessive punishment would make the formation process of 
organization become difficult. So how to guide the organization find the reasonable punishment and incentive 
become the key to control credit risk. 
3.3 Evolutionary game analysis of the credit behavior of complex situations 
Game situation would become complicated when organizations composed by a number of companies. 
The joint costs borne by each enterprise and the incentive inside the organization were impacted by the scale 
and the initial breach proportion. The enterprises were divided into two groups, denoted as group 1 and group 
2. If the tendency that group 1 chose to repay is , similar to the discussion in 3.2. We gained the payoff 
matrix of the organization composed by two groups as shown in table 2. 
Table 2 The payoff matrix of the organization composed by a number of companies  
 Group 2 
Repay Default 
 
Group 1 
Repay '
1
'
1   
'
3
'
2  
Default '
2
'
3  
'
4
'
4   
cI'1 ; SnI
1'
2 ; Sn
cI 1'3 ; KI
'
4  
We could get the expected revenue that the company chosen different strategies: 
'
3
'
1
' )-(1repayU                                     (6) 
'
4
'
2
' )-(1defaultU                                    (7) 
So the average expected revenue is  
defaultrepayaverage UUU )-(1                                (8) 
Similarly, we cloud get strategy dynamic equation  
ESS
1
cK
cSK 2-
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cnsnscKcK
UUUU
dt
d
defaultrepayaveragerepay
---)-(1       
)-)(-(1)-(
2
'''
                   (9) 
Let 0--- 2 cnsnscKcKf , we got two solutions: 
cK
cnscKnscKnscK
2
-4--)-( 2
1                     (10) 
cK
cnscKnscKnscK
2
-4-)-( 2
2          (11) 
Because K+c>0, the image of the function  
(1) If 0- cns , then 01 and 02 . 
Because 1
2
-4-)-( 2
2 cK
cnscKnscKnscK
, the copy function graphics 
and the stability process of ESS shown as figure 3. 
 
Fig.3 The stable process of ESS when 0- cns  
(2)If 0- cns , then 01  and cK
K
2 , the specific case shown in figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4 The stable process of ESS when 0- cns  
(3)If 0- cns , then divided into the following two situations: 
(a)If 0nscK , then 01 and 02 . Breach of policy will eventually become a stable 
1
cns -
21
ESS
12
1cns -
1 cK
K
2
ESS
12
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point as shown in figure 5. 
 
Fig. 5 The stable process of ESS when 0- cns and 0nscK  
(b)If 0nscK , then 10 21 , the ESS process was shown as figure 6. 
 
Fig. 6 The stable process of ESS when 0- cns  and 0nscK  
    From the above analysis, different from 3.2 we know that when consider the scale of the organization and the 
initial breach proportion, the ultimate evolutionary stable proportion is between 0 and 1. It means that 
companies would choose to default if there is no exit mechanism. The formation of the elimination mechanism 
could fundamentally control credit risk.  
4. Summary 
In this paper, we analyzed credit behavior of members in organization based on evolutionary game theory. 
Through the research on organization which composed by two companies, we found out that improve the bank 
punishment K would promote compliance strategies become the ultimate evolutionary stable strategy. And 
guide the organization find the reasonable punishment and incentive become the key to control credit risk. 
Then we consider the situation that the organization had a number of companies, we found out that the ultimate 
evolutionary stable proportion is between 0 and 1. The formation of the elimination mechanism could 
fundamentally control credit risk. 
We assumed that the enterprises are homogeneous and ignore the difference between them. In fact, the 
status of each company in organization is not consistent. We would characterize heterogeneous enterprise and 
organizational structure to make the model closer to reality in future studies. 
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